RADIUS Authentication Methods Compared: PAP vs CHAP vs MS-CHAPv2 vs EAP
RADIUS only carries credentials. The method you choose decides who gets to see the password along the way and how your AAA server has to store it. Both questions matter more in 2026 than they have in years, because the IETF is now moving to retire some of the oldest methods still running in operator networks.
Our new guide compares the four main RADIUS authentication methods side by side and explains where each one still belongs.
It starts with PAP and CHAP, the two methods inherited from PPP that still dominate PPPoE broadband. CHAP keeps the password off the wire, so it has long been treated as the safer option. To verify a login, though, the AAA server must keep every password in reversible form, which means one stolen password store exposes every subscriber. PAP lets you keep salted hashes instead. That’s why the latest IETF RADEXT draft now recommends PAP over CHAP when you judge the system as a whole, as long as the RADIUS link is protected.
MS-CHAPv2 gets a harder verdict. Its response is built from an unsalted MD4 hash of the password, and a single captured exchange is enough to search for what an attacker needs to log in. Revision 10 of the RADEXT draft, dated July 3, 2026, tells implementers to treat it like a clear-text password and bars it unless RadSec, IPsec or a TLS tunnel protects it. The draft is still a work in progress, but the direction is clear.
EAP is where the guide points operators next. Because EAP is a framework, you can adopt a stronger method by changing only the AAA server and the devices, with no new code on the NAS. EAP-TLS uses certificates and EAP-AKA’ uses the keys on the SIM, so no reusable password ever reaches the AAA server or a roaming proxy.
The guide closes with a practical table that maps each access network, from PPPoE and IPoE broadband to carrier Wi-Fi, enterprise 802.1X and VoWiFi, to the method it usually runs today and the one it should move toward. A worked example shows how a regional ISP can delete its reversible password store and shift Wi-Fi users to EAP-TLS, EAP-TTLS with inner PAP, or EAP-AKA’.
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